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Abstract
Recent policy initiatives in the UK and mainland Europe reflect 
a growing acceptance of the need for some form of “parenting 
support”. As several commentators and researchers have noted, 
behind these accounts is an increasingly prescriptive account of 
“good parenting” aimed at ameliorating social, emotional and 
developmental problems.  In this paper, we address the ways in 
which this dominant language of “parenting” defines and 
restricts how we conceptualize and talk about the parent-child 
relationship, and how parents are expected to understand and 
relate to their children.  Specifically, we address the sense in 
which particular theoretical frameworks, primarily from the 
field of developmental psychology, have become normative.  We 
can describe this phenomenon as “the scientization of 
parenting”; a phenomenon captured in the way in which 
theoretical constructs such as “attachment”, which are often 
embedded in a complex and contested background of evaluative 
assumptions, become part of our every-day language about 
“parenting”, and act as universal categories by which to assess 
the quality of particular relationships between parents and 
children, children’s behaviour, or the appropriateness of parental 
choices and actions. 
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2Introduction
The  focus  of  this  paper  is  the  dominant  language  in  which 
childrearing  and  the  parent-child  relationship  are 
conceptualized.  We  will  focus  on  two  aspects  of  this 
conceptualization:  (1)  how  the  discourse/language  of 
(developmental) psychology has taken hold of it; (2) how it is 
pervaded  with  a  sense  of  the  need  for 
expertise/professionalization. Taken together these two aspects 
constitute what we identify as the scientization of the parent-
child relationship. Our concern is with how the developmental-
science language of “parenting” (which we  characterize as the 
third  person-perspective)  defines  and  restricts  both  how  we 
think  and  talk  about  the  parent-child  relationship,  and  how 
parents  understand  themselves—displacing  different,  possibly 
richer ways of thinking and being (which we characterize as the 
first-person perspective).
The assumptions and hidden normativity of developmental 
psychological terms
3The language of developmental psychology has become part of 
our  everyday  way  of  speaking  about  childrearing.   See,  for 
example,  the  product  description  for  the  Arm's  Reach  Co-
Sleeper: “Besides enhancing bonding between parents and their 
baby,  the  Arm's  Reach  Co-Sleeper®  provides  night-time 
security that benefits a growing baby's emotional development”, 
or  the  “Amazing  Baby  Developmental  Duck”,  which  “is 
uniquely created and based on accepted research of how babies 
develop within the first two years of life”. What this illustrates is 
the  way  in  which  everyday  behaviour  is  ‘translated’ into  a 
specific vocabulary. Thus, in a recent handbook for parents the 
editors address what they think of as  questions parents typically 
ask:  “Is  their  young  child’s  unruly  behaviour  a  sign  of 
hyperactivity?  Is  their  teenager’s  moodiness  a  symptom of  a 
dangerous depression? Is their daughter’s latest food fad part of 
an incipient eating disorder? Is her first relationship a prelude to 
pregnancy? Has their son’s skirmish with the law launched him 
on a criminal career?”i Furthermore, developmental psychology 
is responsible for much of the jargon that is used in websites or 
magazine  supplements  for  parents,  whether  “enhancing  well-
being”, “or “experimenting with taking distance from parents”. 
However,  what  seems  to  present  itself  here  as  a  neutral  and 
fairly unproblematic understanding of the relationship between 
parents and children, is in fact anything but neutral. Firstly, the 
language  of  developmental  psychology  assumes  a  causal, 
developmental logic. The way to understand childrearing is in 
terms  of  a  linear-developmental  story,  in  which  certain 
achievements or outcomes are implicitly posited as the desirable 
end-point, and anything parents do along the way has a causal 
effect.  
4This language is evident at the policy level too, as, for example, 
in  the UK government  document  entitled “Parenting Support; 
Guidance  for  Local  Authorities  in  England”,  issued  in 
conjunction with the Every Child Matters policy,ii which opens 
with the confident statement that  “We know the key principles 
of effective parenting”. You don’t have to be a philosopher to 
ask,  “effective  at  what?”  But  these  questions  are  not  asked. 
Behind such statements lies an account, whether explicit or not, 
of  what  the  desirable  “outcome”  of  parenting  should  be; 
emotionally  stable  children;  confident  children;  emotionally 
literate children - take your pick.  
5Even  books  challenging  the  dominant  misunderstandings  that 
abound in popular parenting literature, adopt the same logic as 
that  of  the  discourse  they  are  critiquing.  So  the  authors  of 
Nurture  Shock.  Why  everything  we  think  about  raising  our  
children is wrongiii  repeatedly talk about “hitting developmental 
milestones”.  What  they  address  is  whether  other scientific 
accounts of how to hit these milestones are right or wrong. What 
is not addressed is the very possibility of stepping outside this 
way of talking about what parents are or should be doing.
Secondly, theoretical constructs such as attachment, which are 
often  embedded  in  a  complex  and  contested  background  of 
evaluative  assumptions,  have  become  part  of  our  everyday 
language, acting as universal categories by which to assess the 
quality  of  relationships  between  parents  and  their  children, 
children’s behaviour, or the appropriateness of parental actions. 
Strangely,  this  psychological  language  is  at  once  both 
descriptive and normative. The apparently universal framework 
through which we are encouraged to view parenting practices 
and child development is framed in what we call a third-person 
perspective, in which “children are poorly or securely attached” 
or  “reach  developmental  milestones”;  and  this  becomes  the 
perspective in which parents talk about their own practice. At 
the same time, this framework takes on normative significance 
in that it serves as a standard—often, it seems, the only standard
—against which parenting is judged to have succeeded or failed. 
6However,  psychological  research  into  notions  such  as  infant 
attachment and the associated prescriptive recommendations is 
informed  by  evaluative  judgments  about  the  salience  and 
normative status of particular qualities and behaviouriv. So while 
all  of  these psychological notions have a  respectable  body of 
research  behind  them,  none  are  uncontroversial.  Kagan,  for 
example,  points  out  that  “The  claim that  insecurely  attached 
children  are  at  psychological  risk  because  they  do  not  have 
sensitive mothers is an ethical judgment as to which maternal 
behaviours  and  infant  reactions  to  parental  absence  are 
considered the most virtuous.”v  
This is not to say that e.g. “attachment” or “bonding” are not 
valid  and  useful  descriptive  terms  in  the  context  of  certain 
developmental  observations.  But  their  normative use involves 
assumptions  about  the  desirability  or  adaptivity  of  certain 
character  traits,  behavioural  outcomes  or  personality  types. 
What these traits or achievements are, however, is never itself 
made  the  focus  of  any  ethical  or  conceptual  discussion;  this 
background  of  assumptions  becomes,  rather,  the  unexamined 
backdrop to the normatively significant terms against which we 
think about and judge our practice as parents. 
Professionalization of parents
Parents nowadays are also expected to keep “up-to-date” with 
the latest scientific developments regarding good parenting, thus 
in a sense professionalizing themselves, in order to be able to 
“interact” optimally with their children. Here, too, a particular 
kind  of  language  has  become  part  of  our  ordinary  language. 
Another example is the very expectation that parents nowadays 
should  reflect  on  their  parenting  “approach”,  or  “style”.  The 
parenting  style  most  widely  promoted  and  referred  to  with 
approval  by  practitioners  and  theorists  (see 
http://www.parentingstyles.co.uk/.)  is  the  “authoritative 
7parenting  style”,  considered  the  middle  ground  between  the 
authoritarian and the permissive style. 
8Indeed, the very concept of “parenting” can be seen as part of 
the aspiration to bring all aspect of human experience under the 
auspices of scientific research, where our choices about how to 
act are “backed up by sound evidence”. See for example the title 
of the book Parenting with reason. Evidence-based approaches 
to  parenting  dilemmasvi.  Seeking  expert  advice  here  is 
considered the normal course of action. (Cf. e.g. the homepage 
of  www.parentchannel.tv which  has  a  post-it  saying  “Watch 
videos packed with expert advice on raising children” (retrieved 
2010-05-25).
However,  our point is that scientific research cannot have the 
final  word  in  deciding  for  or  against  this  or  that  particular 
parenting  “style”—not  just  because  there  is  no  “conclusive” 
evidence  (yet),  but  because  this  is  a  matter  of  ethical 
deliberation. It has, first and foremost, to do with questions of 
how we see ourselves as parents, how we wish to relate to our 
children, and what kind of human beings we want our children 
to be.  
“Dan wasn’t attaching”
As  we  have  already  indicated  these  developments  have 
significant implications for how we understand the parent-child 
relationship and, importantly, for how parents come to see and 
understand  themselves.  The  following  example  captures,  we 
think, all the aspects of the concern we’re trying to express here. 
Although the example refers to an unusual – indeed, shocking – 
case, we think it is representative of the point we are making 
about the way parents have absorbed the language and logic of 
developmental psychology. 
In  November  2009,  The  Guardian Family  section  carried  an 
account of a mother who had adopted a child and then,  after 
struggling for several months, decided to give him back to the 
agency  for  re-adoption  (see 
http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/terminating-an-
9adoption/). Many readers were outraged by the mother’s actions, 
and considered her to have failed in her moral duty towards the 
adopted child. What we are interested in here, though, is the way 
the mother in question articulated her reasons for the decision. 
Having done “lots of research on adoption, including attachment 
problems” prior to adoption, she came to the conclusion, about 
half  a  year after  the boy’s  arrival,  that  there were attachment 
problems: “I knew that Dan wasn't attaching” and “I also knew 
that I had issues bonding with him”. She sought help and they 
“had some attachment therapy to strengthen our relationship”, 
but this didn’t solve the problems. She talked a lot about this 
with  her  social  worker  who,  as  the  mother  reports,  “mostly 
listened  and told  me  to  focus  on  Dan's  future  and wellbeing 
above everything else”.  Struggling with her emotions she felt 
“that I wasn't the parent I know I can be, and that I should place 
Dan with a better family, with a better mother.” Eventually the 
social  worker  found another  family,  where  the  mother  was  a 
psychologist,  and who “had adopted another boy with similar 
issues a couple of years before”. Having finally handed over the 
child  to  the  new family,  the  mother  felt  reassured:  “His  new 
mum would love him so, so much; my little man would be OK.”
From the start, the mother has accepted the idea that “parenting” 
is a task or a role, that one can be well or inadequately prepared 
or qualified for it, and, crucially, can perform it well, or fail at it. 
Furthermore, she has absorbed the notion of “attachment” into 
her everyday language and accepted that it is a crucial aspect of 
a successful parenting process. We are not querying the fact that 
the  mother  felt  there  may  be  possible  issues  around  her 
relationship with an adopted child compared to her relationship 
with  her  biological  children.  The  point  is  that  her  way  into 
thinking  about  these  issues  is  through the  supposedly neutral 
scientific concept of attachment. “Not being attached” was seen 
as a  reason  for not being able to parent well. The mother  was 
sure that the evidence suggested that she had failed to develop 
the appropriate degree of “attachment”. Why this was a problem 
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was never articulated. The assumption was that this in itself was 
indicative of a failure at parenting, as it would fail to produce 
the  right  outcome.  There  is  no  prior  questioning  about  what 
attachment means, why it is important, and what role it plays in 
the  context  of  the  mother’s  own  feelings,  desires,  fears  and 
values  about  her  relationship with her  biological  and adopted 
children.  Nor  is  there  any real  articulation  of  what  it  would 
mean  for  Dan  to  “be  OK”,  or  what  his  “wellbeing”  would 
consist of, other than the implication that whether or not he was 
OK would be largely determined by him having the right kind of 
mother. 
The first-person perspective
What the mother was expressing, though, was a fear that may be 
shared, but perhaps not voiced, by many parents, not just those 
contemplating adoption: the fear that we are not loving one of 
our children as much as the other. If we frame this fear in terms 
other than the developmental ones, however, it takes on a very 
different meaning. It becomes a question about love, the nature 
of  love,  the  differences  between  different  types  of  love,  the 
significance for our own flourishing of how, who, and why we 
love.  And  surely  part  of  being  human  and  being  capable  of 
loving and being loved, is to ask these questions; indeed, one 
could argue, to fail to appreciate their meaning and significance 
is to fail to appreciate what love is. The question for parents, on 
this  alternative  account,  is  not  whether  they  are  providing  a 
sufficient amount of love to ensure that their child is achieving 
optimal developmental progress; rather, it is a question of what 
it means to love a particular child, in  the context of a particular 
relationship with particular needs, desires and aspirations. While 
the first question can – and perhaps should – be asked from a 
third-person perspective,  the second only makes sense from a 
first-person perspective.
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Again, we do not want to suggest that we disregard the findings 
of  developmental  psychology.  Admittedly,  we  now  have  a 
greater  understanding  of  how  children’s  emotional  and 
psychological  development  is  influenced  by  their  early 
relationships with their parents. But the ethical underpinnings of 
the ideas and concepts used in this debate are left unexamined, 
and  its  overwhelmingly  empirical,  third-person  language 
(“research has shown…”, “children need…”) obscures the point 
that these concepts are infused with values.  In embracing this 
language as the dominant way to think about upbringing, then, 
we  not  only  rule  out  of  the  discussion  any  enquiry  into  the 
values underpinning it; we also make it increasingly difficult to 
talk about parent-child relationships in the alternative, ethically 
richer,  first-person  perspective.  Thus,  Gerhardt’s  Why  Love 
Mattersvii surely makes  important  points  about  the  impact  on 
infants’ developing neural networks of affectionate and loving 
interaction with their  carers.  Yet even leaving aside questions 
about the empirical validity of her argument, the more important 
point is that if we thought that this story was the only, or even 
the main story we could tell ourselves about “why love matters”, 
we would be offering a seriously impoverished picture of what it 
means to be human, and what it means to be a parent.
Being a parent; uncertainty and doubt
There  is  no  denying  the  fact  that  parents,  in  their  everyday 
interactions  with  their  children,  are  constantly  faced  with 
dilemmas, anxieties, and doubts. Zygmunt Bauman talks about 
how, in post-Enlightenment  times,  our  existential  condition is 
characterized by insecurity.  One response to  this  has been an 
attempt  to  compartmentalize  our  lives  into  manageable  tasks. 
The scientization of parenting can be seen as an expression of 
this: the existential anxiety in the face of the enormity of “being 
a  parent”  is  broken  down into  a  series  of  well-defined  tasks 
(establishing sleeping routines, toilet-training, managing meal-
times) and replaced by a focused anxiety over whether one is 
succeeding  at  performing  these  tasks  well.  As  Bauman  says, 
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“When there are so many means to attend to, who would waste 
time in examining the ends?”viii
Our suggestion that we step back from the causal logic of the 
scientific discourse is a plea to put ethical questions about ends 
back at the heart of our discussions of and as parents. The point 
is not that it does not matter how we choose to behave with our 
children because we can never be sure what effect it will have 
on them. On the contrary, it matters supremely; not because we 
have been entrusted with the job of “parenting” and we must do 
it well, but because our relationship with our children, like other 
human relationships, is inherently ethical.
This  is  not  simply  to  imply  that  we  need  to  judge  the 
appropriateness of a particular intervention in ethical, rather than 
empirical terms. In other words, it is not simply the case that we 
need to stop thinking “I should use the attachment approach/the 
controlled  crying  sleep  routine  because  that  will  make  for  a 
more secure/emotionally stable/happy child” and think, instead, 
“I  should use the approach that best  embodies a moral/caring 
approach to  the child  as  a  human being,  or  that  best  reflects 
particular moral values (respect, caring)”. It is not just that we 
need to direct attention away from the technical-rational model 
of “what works”, but that we need to recognise that asking what 
it means for something to “work”, wanting things to work, and 
worrying that they won’t always work, is part of the experience 
of being a parent.  
“The ethical”, in the sense we are using it here, is conceived not 
in the narrow sense of “morality” as concerned with obligations 
concerning  how to  treat  others,  but  in  the  broad  Aristotelian 
sense of “how to live ones’ life”. Being a parent is part of being 
a person, trying to live one’s life well. If we see the “good of 
parenting” as part of creating a good life, a good society, then 
the context in which we judge parents’ choices and actions will 
be recognized not just as an empirical question—a question of 
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being up-to-date with the latest psychological research—but as a 
moral question; as part of the question of what it means to be 
part of a community, sustaining a good society and introducing 
children into the world. 
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 S. Bailey and M. Shooter, 2009, pp. 1-2
ii DfES,October 2006
iii P. Bronson and A. Merryman, Nurtureshock: Why everything we think about raising our children is wrong, Random 
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iv See, for example, B. Bradley, Visions of Infancy: Critical Introduction to Child Psychology, Polity Press, 1992; E. 
Burman,  Deconstructing developmental psychology (2nd Ed.). London, Routledge, 2008; J.  Kagan,  Three Seductive 
Ideas, Harvard University Press, 1998
v
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 J. Kagan,  Three Seductive Ideas,p. 101.
vi Strahan et al Parenting with reason. Evidence-based approaches to parenting dilemmas, Routledge, London, 2010
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